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Geography, specifically scale, has significant impacts in 
terms of hazards and vulnerability.  Small islands, such as 
those found in the Pacific, experience the impacts of their 
relatively unique geography and scale in terms of hazards 
and vulnerability in at least five ways:  1) Perception and 
communication; 2) Impact and escape from impact; 3) 
Technology; 4) Recovery; and 5) Socio-environmental 
justice.  Comparative analysis in these five areas between 
the Pacific’s small islands and industrialized continental 
regions illuminates differences regarding the way hazards 
and vulnerability should be conceptualized in the under-
treated small islands of the world.  Lessons from this 
analysis will aid in conceptualization of small island 
scenarios, as well as lend guidance to those seeking direct 




Heathcote notes the place of drought, a “natural” hazard, 
in the historical psyche and record of many nations (1969).  
He states: 
The first heroic legend, the Epic of Gilgamesh, which 
dates from the second millenium before Christ, tells how 
King Gilgamesh of Uruk in Mesopotamia fought with, 
and defeated, drought in the form of the Bull of Heaven.  
Written records of drought in China go back at least to 
206 B.C., and in Australia there is abundant evidence of 
droughts both before and after the First Fleet arrived in 
1788 (175) [1]. 
Traditional categories of natural hazards such as 
drought, fire, flood, and those of tectonic origin, as well as 
what are arguably technological hazards in the form of sea 
level rise linked to climate change, and impacts brought 
about by invasive species, all produce severe impacts on 
human and biophysical systems across the globe.  Given 
recent turns in the climate change debate, the traditional 
lines separating “natural” and technological hazards have 
become increasingly blurred.  For example, drought has 
existed, depending on definition, widely over history, yet, it 
is now increasingly linked to climate change.  The 
“blurring” continues, as drought can be defined in terms of 
precipitation, or a combination of direct measurements, 
perhaps in combination with other information, resulting in 
an index score [2].  Or, drought can be declared in terms of 
impacts on a given locale, which, are to a great extent, 
determined by the character of the human systems 
developed there.      
There is great discussion being generated in areas such 
as the climate debate regarding the natural VS. 
technological nature of hazards such as drought, flooding, 
sea level rise, etc.  However, I argue here that while “on the 
ground,” the discourse revolving around the nexus of 
hazards-technology-economy-justice-science are not 
unimportant, or even lost on “victims,” they are just not as 
important as how to adapt.   For example, less-wealthy 
countries such as India might be blamed for high emissions 
of green house gases, and they might, in return, point to the 
Northern countries high per capita emissions and the unjust 
nature of consuming such a large portion of the 
atmospheric commons per person.   
“Winning” the argument is important, but can’t ease the 
concerns about sea level rise which worry those in the 
Maldives (small atolls with a maximum natural height of 
2.3 m, or 7½ ft, S.W. of India, where over the last century 
sea levels have risen 20 cm, or 8 in).  What potentially has 
greater value on the ground are contextualized policies to 
address hazards utilizing multi-scale knowledge of human 
and biophysical systems.  To do such analysis it is helpful 
to consider some broad impacts of geography, especially 
scale, on mitigation and adaptation.  Here I remain with the 
small island model, which I contrast to continental 
scenarios, but I change location to the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), where I have worked since 2002 
[Figure 1].   
 
2. Perception and communication 
 
As Cutter (2004) points out, how we as societies 
perceive and evaluate risks is a subjective process – and 
therein lies the contested nature of coping with hazards [3].  
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Geography impacts perception and communication 
regarding hazards in small islands in FSM in ways that, 
say, a typical hazard relief worker in the U.S., might not 
anticipate.   
FSM represents a typical Pacific small island scenario, 
as the exclusive economic zone is about 1,000,000 miles, 
but the land mass is less than the state of Delaware!  (One 
can find other more well-known examples in S.E. Asia, 
where the Philippines encompasses over 7,000 islands with 
the approximate land mass of Arizona.)  In the U.S., a 
major concern is the translation of science to hazard policy.  
In FSM and similar places, the main concerns are whether 
there is any communication that a hazard may be occurring, 
unscientific perceptions regarding a given hazard’s 
geographic and temporal scope of impact, how to find 
funds, and how to communicate effectively in multiple 
languages.   
Undoubtedly, continental areas face some of the same 
barriers to hazard mitigation and adaptation, but they are 
magnified in the small island world.  This is because in a 
fragmented island environment, working across many small 
islands, with few appropriate boats and planes, at too great 
a distance for an effective signal, often without electricity, 
never mind the Internet, people can remain oblivious to a 
hazard’s potential impact.  This impacts both emergency 
response, as well as setting up programs for adaptation.  
Small islands often simply do not have the resources to 
reach out to communities on a village scale in a 
geographically disconnected nation.   
In addition, governance in such settings as FSM is often 
only effective if driven by village scale, or traditional, 
leaders [4].  Working with so many leaders at that scale is 
difficult, especially under time constrains, and particularly 
for outsiders who are hazards experts from “the mainland,” 
as is said in FSM when referring to the U.S. (or “the 
states,” as is said in the Philippines).  Collaboration must 
take the place of the hammer of federal level (scale) of 
authority, and it takes significant time to nurture 
collaboration.  At times, national scale laws are not 
respected in such settings.   
When focusing on collaboration for adaptation, the 
problem might very well be that a grant demands “outputs” 
from early stages.  However, real progress, the kind that 
sustains after outsiders leave, only is possible once real 
relationships have been built, and outsiders learn about 
diverse island cultures, and what technologies can sustain 
in that fragmented physical, economic and political 
environment.  Sometimes persons might believe that if they 
recognize or “connect” to some pieces of a given culture 
that appears the same as back home, such as Catholic 
worship and English being spoken in the Philippines, then 
they can work effectively in that culture.  However, this 
reflects a naïve view of the role of science across cultures, 
vested interest, as well as politics.  A practical example is a 
Westerner misreading signals in the Philippines, where a 
“yes” is not always a “yes,” as it can merely be a way avoid 
rudely say ‘no.”  You may walk away feeling the mission 
was accomplished, only to be shocked upon return to see 
nothing has changed because persons either did not really 
understand you, did not agree with you, had different 
priorities, or poor communication precluded the sense of 
urgency you felt was inherent.  These aforementioned 
examples underscore that communication is different in 
character and effective scale (i.e. village) in many such 
settings.  This may be seen as supporting a role for regional 
and cultural specialists in what are normally technical 
endeavors for “scientists.” 
 
3. Impact and escape from impact 
 
There are perhaps fewer nuances to the next point, but it 
is also essential to understand in terms of seeking 
mitigation and adaptation.  Simply put, there is physically 
less room for mistakes on small islands, less room and 
diversity of topography, climate, and biogeography to 
escape to, and far further and more expensive to go to seek 
assistance in dealing with hazards.  (Remoteness may also 
result in lack of essential data.)  
In small islands of less than, say, a square mile, there is 
literally nowhere to relocate to if a place becomes 
inhabitable.  Persons must continue to live in the hazardous 
moment, not retreat to let the experts in.  Consider the case 
of Hurricane Katrina and its attending floods in the U.S., 
where, despite many botched attempts to plan for, and then 
cope with, the crisis, many persons were able to evacuate to 
Houston and other cities by car.  In contrast, most people in 
small islands can often do is to seek higher ground or 
wetter or drier parts of a given island, and this is not much 
of an option in low islands.  Going back to the example of 
the Maldives, a group of low islands, tsunami impacts in 
2004 pushed the ocean on top of many islands, physically 
remaking them.  Thus, in seeking mitigation and 
adaptation, the barrier of moving across long distances by 
boat, perhaps by air with aid, likely in the throws of a given 
hazard with the population unable to move away, represents 





Much hazard mitigation may require implementation of 
technology.  These technologies may simplified for the 
purposes of this discussion by dividing them into long and 
short-term technological interventions.  Of course, the 
discussion is truncated in this case.  I focus here mainly on 
technologies that seek to provide long-term contributions to 
coping with hazards and helping populations to adapt. 
Long-term technologies are those which must sustain 
(often self-sustain)in the physical, economic, and political 
climate of a given region for significant time.  An example 
from my own research is the effort to mitigate waterborne 
disease.  In many wealthier continental settings centralized 
water purification systems are able to stretch across 
significant space to provide safe drinking water.  Such 
systems may be more or less expensive depending on 
factors such as economies of scale and the nature of the 
distribution network, ground water (less treatment may be 
needed) VS. surface water, local and federal treatment 
standards, etc.  Effective treatment of water, as well as 
establishment of an effective sewage network can support 
environmental health and prevent disease outbreaks.   
However, in small island settings, the fragmented 
geographic setting precludes centralized approaches 
[Figure 2].  In addition, while the islands may be small, the 
population density may be intense for historical reasons.  In 
fact, it may be more dense than statistics convey, as per 
square mile measurements, for example, do not mean much 
when the island is less than a sq. mi. and the inhabitants 
squeeze along the coast against steep slopes [Table 1].  
How does one stretch distribution pipes from a centralized 
water system across the water?  The question is practically 
rhetorical.  However, some attempts have been tried, and 
failed, such as in the Philippines [5].  And, if only some 
islands can get the expensive centralized system, then 
which one(s) should get it?!  My experience is that the 
place where government officials and/or tourists stay is 
likely to receive the potential benefit.    
Small island economies also play a role in determining 
what is possible.  For instance, consider FSM, where 
unemployment rates vary significantly (though the 
usefulness of the term “employment” where a “subsistence” 
lifestyle is prevalent is dubious), from 4.1 percent in Yap, 
to 12.3 in Pohnpei and 16.5 in Kosrae, to 34.2 percent for 
Chuuk.  Of nearly 29,000 employed persons in 2000, 52 
percent were engaged in agricultural, fishery, or “related” 
activities.  Some 30 percent were engaged in market-
oriented agricultural, fishing, or related activities, with the 
rest existing in a subsistence lifestyle [6 & 7] [Figures 3].  
These factors, in combination with the aforementioned 
dominance of village and family-scale governance on an 
island-by-island basis, form a gestalt, so that centralized 
technologies and mandates assumed to trickle down from 
the federal scale are effectively neutered.  I argue that what 
is called for are long-term relationships between multiple 
scales of governance and outside hazards specialists, ones 
not created with a national government when crisis occurs.  
Additionally, small, decentralized technologies, especially 
those using native products such as local sand, may be best 
suited in collaborating with locals to find physically, 
economically and politically sustainable technologies.  
Small may not only be “beautiful,” but may also be more 
affordable, easier to run and fix, and distributed in a more 




The last three places settled on earth were likely 
Micronesia, Polynesia and New Zealand [10, 11, 12 & 13].  
This speaks to the remoteness of Pacific small islands.  This 
also provides perspective regarding the challenge to outside 
experts and governments to assist with recovery efforts 
after populations have been impacted by hazards. 
While networks such as the Pacific Tsunami Warning 
Center [14] have great scientific value, provide important 
warnings to countries all around the Pacific (including the 
U.S. state of Hawai`i, where it is based), there is real doubt 
whether the lives saved by it outside the wealthier world 
are sufficient.  For example, just recently the Solomon 
Islands lost many lives due to a Tsunami.  The scientific 
data may have been collected, and important warning 
information might have been mapped on the Internet, but 
many people lost their lives just the same.  This is in part 
because the message did not arrive where it was needed 
most, and in part because immediate response and recovery 
efforts are difficult in a far-flung group of islands such as 
the Solomons.   
Contrast this 2007 Solomons disaster to the 9-11 
experience in the U.S., where, in just moments after a 
major incident, jet planes were in the air, Internet, radio and 
television were providing coverage of events in real time, 
and fire, police and other services were mobilized.  
Warnings aside, the response from local and adjoining 
areas was rapid and extensive, and was underlain by 
transportation technologies, relative location, and economic 
strength.  In the U.S., even single lost boater can trigger 
massive Coast Guard search and rescue missions. 
 
6. Socio-environmental justice 
 
The nexus of hazards, class, and geography widely 
manifests inequities in terms of vulnerability.  This is 
observed in the continental U.S., where, for example, 
Bullard’s salient work [15] produced evidence of racism in 
hazard management.  For small islands, a new issue has 
emerged as a core concern, with strong elements of justice 
to consider.  Small islands, which produce little green 
house gas, nevertheless, are most vulnerable to sea level 
rise, drought, and increased storm intensity being linked to 
global warming.  These three hazards can lead to 
salinization of soil and degradation of very shallow 
freshwater lenses, as well as the physical destruction of 
countries.  Of course, this contrast of continental and small 
island conditions is a generalization, and so exceptions, 
such as the vulnerable coastal regions of Bangladesh, are 
worth noting.   
 Nevertheless, if one is willing to accept that at least, 
global warming is being enhanced by modern industrial 
practices, then it follows that a systematic enhancement of 
small island vulnerability is underway that is driven as 
much by the political economy paradigm of the wealthy, as 
by nature and geography.  This forms a sort of hydrologic 
extension to the concept of “Third World dumping.” [16]  
When small island geography, natural threats, and this 
new political economy of climate change converge to form 
a sort of “perfect storm,” the synergistic effects result in an 
enhanced difference in vulnerability between industrialized 
continental and small island nations.  Perhaps a bit of a 
stretch to use the term “unpacking,” to refer to the pulling 
apart of differences in vulnerability to recognize the equally 
important roles of political economy, science, technology, 
and culture.  Nevertheless, I argue that once one unpacks 
the condition of vulnerability on small islands today, it 
becomes apparent that there are as many salient questions 
pertaining to social and environmental justice, as there are 
regarding “appropriate technologies,” science, island 
geography and hazard policy.  An examination of official 
documents from the Small Island Developing States 
Network Web site offers a plethora of case studies and 




     Geography, both physical and cultural, provides a 
backdrop to any useful examination of small island hazards 
and vulnerability.  Scale, more predictably in terms of 
biophysical systems, and perhaps less intuitively in terms of 
village VS. macro governmental systems, represents a core 
set of issues to consider in attempting to translate lessons 
learned in hazard and vulnerability mitigation in wealthy 
continental areas to small island worlds.  Those outside the 
small island community wishing to engage in hazard 
mitigation in the small island environment must do more 
than understand “cutting-edge” science and technology to 
succeed.  Rather, such persons must come to grips with the 
unique geography of small islands, so that they can put 
their knowledge in the proper multi-scale context and forge 
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Table 1.  Population density for FSM:  1994 and 2000 
(Source:  Calculated from data from the Division of 




























































































         
Figure 
1. 
Micronesian EEZ.  (Karolle 1993.) 
















































































        































Figure 3.  Fefan, Chuuk, FSM.  Upper left a 
northeast view of Fefan from Southern 
Weno.  Upper right northwest coast 
including study area of the Island of Fefan.  
Lower left study basin including villages of 
Onongoch, Fein & Fogen.  Lower right a 
study basin home. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
